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DAVID LYONS

OPEN TEXTURE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION'
(Accepted July 28, 1999)

This essay concerns the possibility of interpreting law. It is always
possible to interpret law in the weak sense, which assigns meaning
it is not assumed the law previously possessed. My concern here is
interpretationin the strong sense, which, if successful, reveals meaning that lies hidden in the law. Theories of legal interpretation have
recently received much theoretical attention. The received theory of
law's open texture suggests that this interest is misplaced.
Interpretation is most clearly called for when there is reasonable
uncertainty or disagreement about law's meaning or proper application. The received theory of law's open texture implies, however,
that legal interpretation is impossible when language gives rise to
reasonable uncertainty or disagreement about law's meaning and
proper application.
Furthermore, ideas surrounding open texture theory imply that
this predicament is even more widespread. They tell us that
interpretation is impossible whenever there is reasonable uncertainty or disagreement, from any source, about law's meaning or
proper application. The received theory thus indicates that there is
little scope for a theory of legal interpretation.
This paper argues, first, that the received theory misconstrues
the legal implications of the open texture of language. It argues,
secondly, that open texture theory provides an untenable basis for
rejecting the possibility of legal interpretation. This paper assumes
no theory of interpretation, not even that interpretation of law is
generally possible. It concerns ideas about law that are widely
1 My thanks to Thad Metz and anonymous reviewers for this journal for their
comments and suggestions.
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accepted among theorists and which, if sound, would seem to rule
out the possibility of legal interpretation. 2
I'll first summarize Hart's theory of law's open texture and
consider its supposed implications. Later I'll address the terms in
which Hart presents that theory and their broader (though possibly
unintended) implications.

A. OPEN TEXTURE

Consider the example used by Hart in his exposition of open
texture theory. 3 A local ordinance bans vehicles from the public
park. Competent users of English will readily agree that "vehicle"
applies to automobiles but does not apply to peanut butter and jelly
sandwiches. Let's assume that competent users of English are uncertain or disagree about whether bicycles are vehicles. 4 Like many
paradigmatic vehicles that might be brought into a park, bicycles
are used for transport, have wheels, can move on their own (at least
when fully equipped with a cyclist), and so on; but they lack conventional motors (electrically powered or internal combustion), are
normally quiet and unpolluting, routinely share paths with pedestrians, and so on. There are good reasons for regarding bicycles as
vehicles and good reasons against doing so.
If bicycles seem clearly to qualify as vehicles, try children's
tricycles; if bicycles seem clearly not to qualify, consider batterypowered, electrically propelled, motorized wheelchairs instead.
Nothing turns on our choice of example.
Hart says that any general term in a natural language has a central "core" of determinate meaning and a surrounding "penumbra"
2 My arguments have little in common with Ronald Dworkin's in "The
Model of Rules," University of Chicago Law Review 35 (1967), 14-46 (reprinted in Taking Rights Seriously [Harvard 1977]) or "No Right Answer?", New
York University Law Review 53 (1978) 1-32 (reprinted in A Matter of Principle
[Harvard 1985]).
3 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw (Oxford 1961; Second Edition 1994), chap.
VII, sec. 1. (Parenthetical page references will be to the Second Edition.)
4 Note that there can be reasonable uncertainty not only about what things are
vehicles, but also about what counts as "operating" a vehicle, "bringing" one into
a park, under what circumstances a vehicle is truly "in" a park, etc.
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of indeterminate meaning. (123) Thus "vehicle" applies to automobiles, does not apply to sandwiches, and (I shall assume) its
application to bicycles is problematic. Hart appears to mean that a
general term is true of those items to which it clearly applies, isfalse
of those items beyond the penumbra to which it clearly does not
apply, and is neither true norfalse of penumbral items ("vehicle" is
neither true nor false of bicycles).
Hart infers from these considerations that the rule banning
vehicles from the park likewise has a core of determinate meaning
and a penumbra of indeterminate meaning. If "vehicle" is neither
true nor false of bicycles, then bicycles are neither barredfrom the
park by the rule nor permitted by it. Unless some other rule of law
pushes bicycles from the vehicular penumbra, they linger in that
legal limbo until the law is made more precise.
In order to decide penumbral cases, Hart says, courts must, and
do, further develop the rules. In deciding whether to count bicycles
as vehicles, 5 a court expands the rule's core of determinate meaning.
A court must assign the rule an increment of determinate meaning
that it did not have. The refined rule is then capable of deciding
similar cases. Courts thus act as surrogate legislatures, filling gaps
by amending the law.
Hart does not suggest that a judge deciding a penumbral case is
free to amend the rule any way she likes. A judge is expected to
display "characteristic judicial virtues" such as
impartiality and neutrality in surveying the alternatives; consideration for the
interest of all who will be affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable
general principle as a reasoned basis for decision. (205)

Traditional maxims guide a judge's rule-refining decisions, and her
choice will be limited to a small set of alternatives. But, Hart insists,
no single one of them will be required by existing law.
The point I wish now to emphasize is this. Hart holds that gaps
in ordinary 6 rules are gaps in the law as a whole. If a case involves a
fact-situation that falls in the penumbra of an applicable rule, a court
cannot decide it on the basis of existing law; it can be decided only
by adding to the law. That is the first point I wish to question. I shall
5 Hart says, "for the purposes of this rule" and refers to "peace in the park."
(129) But he discounts legislative intent as a basis for interpreting law. (136)
6 My reason for using this term will emerge in a moment.
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do so on grounds that are neutral with respect to legal theories as we
know them.
Although Hart argues that there is more than one basic type of
legal rule, I shall focus here on the restrictive rules of legal systems
- rules that require or prohibit certain forms of behavior, such as
bringing vehicles into the park. That will suffice for my first point.
Let's assume that vehicles are not banned from the park save by
the vehicle-banning law. An item is either banned or is not banned
by that rule. The rule does not ban non-vehicles, such as sandwiches.
We are assuming that it neither bans nor permits bicycles.
My claim is that the law is generally asymmetrical with respect
to banning and permitting. If bicycles are not banned from the park
by any legal rule (or any other legal norm, if there are legal norms
other than rules), then bicycles are permitted in the park by the law.
That seems to me a reasonable view of human law, the law of
legal systems (more certain, at any rate, than open texture theory).
We can express the point by framing it as a background principle,
that conduct which is not legally prohibitedis legally permitted.
Consider, then, Ann's operating a bicycle in the public park from
which vehicles have been banned. If her act falls within the rule's
penumbra, as we are supposing, so that the rule neither prohibits
nor permits such conduct, it does not follow that the legal system
of which the rule is a component part neither prohibits nor permits
such conduct. The specific rule does not settle the issue, but the
legal system would seem to do so. If, as we are further assuming, no
rule or other legal norm prohibits Ann's act and, as seems true, the
law permits whatever the rules of law do not prohibit, then Ann's
bicycling in the park is permitted by the law - by the system as
a whole. In other words, the open texture of general terms and of
rules does not automatically give rise to gaps in the law.
It might now be suggested that we can equally well infer (by
parity of reasoning, but inconsistently with the point just made) that
conduct in the penumbra of a restrictive rule is likewise prohibited,
because the vehicle-banning rule no more permits than prohibits
bicycles. That would miss the point. Legal freedom is the default
condition.
Contrary to open texture theory, the indeterminacy of the law
cannot be inferred from the indeterminacy of its ordinary rules. The
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open texture of general terms is one thing, the open texture of rules
is another, the open texture of law is something else again. The first
may imply the second, but neither the first nor the second (nor the
first and second together) imply the third.
Now let's consider this case in court. Ann has been charged with
violating the rule banning vehicles from the park. The judge must
determine whether riding a bike in the park is a violation of the law
by virtue of its violating that rule. If the vehicle-banning rule does
not prohibit such conduct (and no other rule does so indirectly), and
if the judge decides the case according to existing law, then the judge
must hold that such conduct does not violate the law. The judge must
find that there's no cause of action. For whatever isn't prohibited is
permitted.7
As we have seen, this is not the approach that Hart believes
judges actually take in penumbral cases. Hart's discussion implies
that a judge would (and should) view Ann's case as follows. She
would first determine that Ann's act is neither prohibited nor permitted by existing law. Finding that gap in the law, she would assume
the office of surrogate legislator and would proceed to modify the
rule, so as to fill the gap. Then she would apply the revised rule
retrospectively.
But judges do not generally act in that way. A judge may
comment on difficulties arising from a bad fit between the facts of
a case and the language of a statute that she is called upon to apply.
But she is unlikely to declare that the rule neither prohibits nor
permits the act, conclude that the law does not prohibit the conduct
that has been attributed to the defendant, and then amend the law.
Hart acknowledges that judges act as if they interpret the rules
that they are called on to apply. (135-136; 273-274)8 When judges
issue opinions in cases that seem to call for interpretation of the
7 Someone might suggest that this would be an undesirable policy - too lenient
on law breakers. That would assume, however, that Ann violated the law, or in
other words that bicycles are prohibited by the vehicle-banning rule - which open
texture theory denies. Open texture theory implies that Ann has not in fact broken
the law.
8 In his Postscript (included in the posthumously published Second Edition),
Hart once again discounts "the ritual language used by judges and lawyers in
deciding cases" and notes further that eminent judges and lawyers agree that law
is sometimes indeterminate. (274) The question is not, however, whether there is
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law, they do not generally suggest that they are making new law and
applying it retroactively. They provide reasons for their reading of
existing law and reasons against competing interpretations. And it
is not merely judges who act as if they interpret law. When judges
write opinions, they may respond to the arguments of lawyers and
of dissenting colleagues who defend competing interpretations. The
lawyers do not generally suggest that they are arguing for revisions
in the law. Legal academics likewise defend some interpretations as
soundly based on existing law and criticize competing interpretations as unsound. If judges, lawyers, and legal academics act in that
manner and do not behave as Hart believes they do and should, an
explanation is required.
There is a further reason for puzzlement. Systems of law like
ours are committed to the idea that people deserve fair warning
of legal liability. A rule imposing liability should be publicized
before conduct may legitimately be penalized under it. This provides
another reason to hold that, if the theory of law's open texture
is sound, we should expect judges not to revise the law and
apply it retrospectively, without apparent qualms, but to throw out
penumbral cases.
I have now sketched two alternative ways in which open texture
theory suggests judges might be expected to deal with penumbral
cases - if they understand what they are doing and proceed without
pretence. If we assume, with Hart, that such cases are undecidable
on the basis of existing law and are disposed of by applying retrospective judicial legislation, we should expect that fact to be more
clearly manifested in judicial behavior and in legal practice more
generally. It is not.9
The other way in which judges might deal with penumbral cases
is suggested by what seems a reasonable view of law, which includes
some legal indeterminacy but whether it obtains wherever the received theory of
law's open texture implies.
9 In the Postscript Hart suggests that "resistance to the claim that judges
sometimes ... make ... law" is principally explained by "the importance characteristically attached by courts when deciding unregulated cases to proceeding
by analogy so as to ensure that the new law they make, though it is new law,
is in accordance with principles or underpinning reasons recognized as already
having a footing in the existing law." (274) It is unclear, however, how this use of
analogical reasoning explains the relevant systematic and uniform legal practice.
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the background principle that conduct which is not prohibited is
permitted. On that view, we should expect penumbral cases to be
thrown out. They aren't.
There seems a clash, then, between open texture theory and
the seemingly interpretative behavior of judges, lawyers, and legal
academics. That fact might lead our thinking in either of two directions. If open texture theory is sound, then judges and lawyers either
sincerely try to do, or make a pretense of doing, what open texture
theory tells us they could not possibly be doing, namely, figuring
out what the law already requires and allows. In that case, judges
and other legal professionals are either deluded or deceitful: they
have either deceived themselves about their practice or they systematically misrepresent it. In the latter case, the lawyers and legal
academics are really urging that the law be amended in certain ways
and the judges are really endorsing some legislative amendments
and rejecting others.
Although we can assume that judges and lawyers, like other
mortals, can be and sometimes are confused or deceitful, the clash
between open texture theory and legal practice suggests that the
confusion or deceit of legal professionals is quite extensive. I
think we should hesitate to embrace a view of law that implies
so sweeping a disparagement of the bench and the bar on purely
abstract, theoretical grounds, without corroborating factual evidence. It would not only be unfair; it would seem methodologically
unsound - jumping to a weakly supported conclusion without
considering the alternatives.
We should therefore consider the second possibility - that open
texture theory is unsound.

B. OVERKILL

Hart's presentation of open texture theory proves too much. Let's
look at what he actually says.
Hart says that when a fact-situation falls within the determinate
core of a term's meaning, one
has only to recognize instances of clear verbal terms, to "subsume" particular
facts under general classificatory heads and draw a simple syllogistic conclusion.
(125)
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But not every situation is like that, for "there is a limit, inherent
in the nature of language, to the guidance which general language
can provide." Some "fact-situations ... possess only some of the
features of the plain cases but others which they lack." (126) As
a consequence,
something in the nature of a crisis in communication is precipitated: there are
reasons both for and against our use of a general term, and no firm convention
or general agreement dictates its use, or, on the other hand, its rejection by the
person concerned to classify. (127)

In these penumbral cases, "subsumption and the drawing of a syllogistic conclusion" are impossible, and "something in the nature of a
choice between open alternatives must be made." (127)
Some qualifications (friendly amendments) seem in order. We
should probably understand "reasons both for and against our use of
a general term" to mean "good but less than decisive reasons both
for and against our use of a general term." 10 And we can probably
dispense with the added reference to "a firm convention or general
agreement" regulating use of the term, for a convention or agreement would simply provide reasons, decisive or otherwise, for or
against application of the term.
Hart's discussion thus suggests the following model for the
application of a rule. A rule applies to a given fact-situation if, and
only if, the situation provides good reasons for subsuming the case
under the rule and provides no good reason not to. Suppose the
rule is
1. Anyone who operates a vehicle within the public park is
subject to a $50 fine.
For this rule to apply, the facts must fit perfectly the highlighted
segment. Suppose that
a. Jack drove his car in the park.
The question, according to Hart, is whether driving a car clearly
counts as operating a vehicle - whether there are good reasons for
so counting it and no good reasons to the contrary. Let's assume that
that is so; in other words:
b. Driving a car clearly counts as operating a vehicle.
In that case, we can draw the syllogistic conclusion:
10

I'll abbreviate this hereafter by omitting "but less than decisive."
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2. Jack operated a vehicle in the park.
Premises a and b entail conclusion 2. Propositions 1 and 2 entail
the conclusion
3. Jack is subject to a $50 fine.
Now compare the case of Ann, who rode her bicycle in the park.
For the purpose of illustrating open texture, we have been assuming
there are good reasons both for and against our application of the
general term "operating a vehicle" to the act of riding a bicycle, so
that Ann's case falls in the penumbra of the rule.
Note that we are not to ask whether "operating a vehicle" is true
of riding a bicycle, for that is what this test is meant to determine.
The applicability of a general term depends on whether there are
good reasons for and against its application.
This would explain why Hart neglects the topic of interpretation, although he comments on the assignment of meaning by
courts. Attempts at interpretation are occasioned by the existence
of non-negligible considerations on two sides of a legal question
- reasonable grounds for more than one way of understanding
and applying a law. If genuine interpretation of law is possible, it
involves balancing conflicting legal considerations, and this does not
fit Hart's syllogistic model.
Although Hart explicitly refers to syllogistic reasoning only in
connection with the application of a general term to a fact-situation,
his discussion seems to commit him to a syllogistic model much
more generally. For he holds that, when there are good reasons on
each side of a legal question raised by a case, so that balancing of
them is needed, there is no "uniquely correct answer." (132)
Thus Hart seems to reject out of hand the possibility that a rule
might have determinate implications when they cannot be derived
from it deductively. This suggests that he would also reject the idea
that the law might have determinate implications for a case when its
rules cannot be applied deductively - when they apply contrariwise
to the case, so that balancing of them is required. Hart suggests that
legal judgments can be derived from general legal rules when, but
only when, the rules apply unequivocally.1 1
11 This seems the closest that Hart comes to embracing the "model of rules"
that Dworkin attributes to him in "The Model of Rules." Contrary to Dworkin's
claims, however, these points have no bearing on the essentials of legal positivism;
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On such a view, there would seem to be no scope at all for the
interpretation of law - at least interpretation that is occasioned by
conflicting legal considerations. Hart's presentation of open texture
theory precludes it.
But open texture theory needs revision, for it proves too much.
As presented by Hart, it implies that true descriptions cannot be
uncertain or controversial. And that's implausible.
Consider what Hart says about laws that incorporate moral or
evaluative terms. He imagines that "the legislature may require an
industry ... to charge only a fair rate or to provide safe systems of
work." Hart regards these as "vague standards" and suggests that
they are substantially less determinate than rules lacking such terms.
He says that some "cases of what is, or is not, a 'fair rate' or a
'safe system' will always be identifiable ab initio," but "these are
only the extremes ... and are not likely to be met in practice." In the
"real cases," application of such a law requires an "official choice"
between different ways of balancing the "conflicting interests." It is
impossible for there to be "one uniquely correct answer." (131-132)
Hart's discussion thus suggests that legal rules incorporating moral
or evaluative terms are more gappy than determinate - virtually all
applications of them are penumbral.
We can understand this as follows. Consider the circumstances in
which a court will be asked to apply a law requiring safe systems of
work. It is extremely likely that each of the opposing sides will be
well informed and equipped with supporting arguments that cannot
be dismissed out of hand. There is likely to be some good reason
for regarding a proposed or existing system as safe and some good
reason for regarding it as unsafe. That fact satisfies Hart's condition
for legal indeterminacy. The interpretation of a law with moral or
evaluative language is thus out of the question.
But there seems no reason to assume that moral and evaluative
standards have no uniquely correct application because interests
conflict and good reasons are available on both sides. 12
nor do they flow from the essentials of Hart's theory of law, as developed in The
Concept of Law, chaps. I-VI. (In the Postscript, however, Hart counts his open
texture theory as "central to [his] theory of law." (259))
12 In the Postscript Hart says that "legal theory should avoid commitment to
controversial theories ... and should leave open ... the question of the objective
standing moral judgments." (253-254) Instead of avoiding such a commitment,
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And as Hart himself did not address "real" issues of political
morality with skeptical diffidence, I am not at all sure that he
would be happy with those or other implications of his open texture
theorizing. 13
On the one hand, his discussion seems to imply, falsely, that there
will often be no "uniquely correct answers" to historical, scientific,
and other factual questions. On the other hand, Hart's theoretical
objectives do not seem to require so extreme a notion of open
texture.

As to the first point, suppose that the legislature enacts a law
restricting development at sacred sites of the indigenous population. Suppose, further, that the location of ancient sites has been
obscured as a result of changes in the land wrought by the nonindigenous expropriators of it over many generations. Experts might
well disagree about the true location of ancient sites, in which case
there would be reasonable disagreement about the application of
the general term "sacred site." Subsumption and the drawing of a
syllogistic conclusion would be impossible, and open texture theory
would imply that there is a corresponding gap in the law. Despite
that fact, it seems reasonable to assume that ancient sites had, and
therefore retain, precise locations, of which "sacred site" is true.
Similarly, if the legislature restricted development on hundredyear flood plains, inadequate records and differing theories about
flooding could generate reasonable uncertainty or disagreement
among experts as to the boundaries of such plains. We might
well suppose, however, that "hundred-year flood plain" is true of
certain geographical areas and not others. Hart's presentation of
however, Hart includes the contrary view in his legal theories. He accepts, for
example, "that the rule of recognition may incorporate as criteria of legal validity
conformity with moral principles or substantive values." (250) This implies that,
in those cases, rules cannot be validated as law unless they satisfy the appropriate moral or evaluative criteria. When he insists, however, that "the law may be
identified without reference to morality," (270) he in effect assumes that there are
no determinate moral or evaluative criteria and incorporates into his legal theory
the notion that moral judgments lack objective standing. This accords with his
treatment of moral and evaluative criteria in his discussion of law's open texture.
13 In Ethics and the Rule of Law (Cambridge 1984), p. 52, I mentioned that
relativism is implied by Hart's treatment of morality in The Concept of Law. As
he soon after remarked to me, "Of course, I did not mean that." The same applies
here.
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open texture theory would seem, however, to imply the contrary.
Examples like these can be multiplied indefinitely.
Hart employs too weak a condition for indeterminacy. He should
also distinguish conflicting reasons due to linguistic indeterminacy
from those occasioned by other factors, such as conflicting theories
and evidence.
And a more modest conception of open texture would serve
his announced theoretical purposes adequately. Hart contrasts his
doctrine with two competing views: the "formalist" notion that law
always provides adequate grounds for deciding any legal question
that might arise and the "realist" claim that law never does so. He
holds that each view makes but exaggerates a valid point. Offered
as a moderate mean between those two theoretical extremes, Hart's
theory claims that law often provides adequate grounds for deciding
legal questions but cannot always do so.
Hart's basic point concerns the limited precision of language. 14
He allows that law's determinacy can be enlarged, but he argues that
indeterminacy can never be banished entirely, as it flows from law's
unavoidable use of language. Hart might still be able to make that
more limited (but theoretically significant) point without suggesting
that indeterminacy obtains whenever there are good reasons both for
and against the application of a general term used in law. 15

C. FURTHER REFLECTIONS

Hart's first. In responding to Dworkin's criticisms, Hart comments
on related issues.
(i) Although he confirms our understanding of open texture
theory (252; 272-276), Hart is equivocal about the surrounding
ideas. In distinguishing "hard cases," which he says are "controversial in the sense that reasonable and informed lawyers may disagree
about which answer is legally correct," from cases in which "the law
14 Hart does not claim that all legal indeterminacies arise from open texture. He
regards judicial precedents as loci of more radical indeterminacy, and he would
no doubt regard conflicts between statutes or precedents, among other factors, as
sources of indeterminacy.
15 Whether such an argument could succeed depends, of course, on overcoming
objections I raised in Section A.
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... is fundamentally incomplete" (252), he implies that reasonable
disagreement is not a sufficient condition of legal indeterminacy. But in characterizing "hard cases" as "cases which the law
had left completely unregulated" (276), he implies that reasonable
disagreement is a sufficient condition of legal indeterminacy.
(ii) The balance seems to be tipped in the latter direction by
Hart's discussion of legal principles. (259ff) Hart acknowledges "the
explanatory and justificatory role of principles in relation to rules"
(260) and "their 'non-conclusive' character." (261) One of his main
points is that
in any hard case different principles supporting competing analogies may present
themselves and a judge will often have to choose between them, relying, like
a conscientious legislator, on his sense of what is best and not on any already
established order of priorities prescribed for him by law. (275)

What can we conclude? My aim has been modest: to address an
assumption that seems frequently to be made in legal theory, which
implies that interpretation of law is impossible when it is needed. I
have not argued (nor do I suppose) that legal rules lack open texture
or, more importantly, that there are no indeterminacies in law. My
point is that reasonable uncertainty and disagreement are usually
taken as occasions for interpreting the law - for figuring out meaning that it may have. Open texture theory implies that interpretation
is then impossible, but it provides no good reason for believing that
to be the case. Given the failure of open texture theory, we may
reasonably consider theories of legal interpretation on their merits.
Nothing said so far provides support for any such theory, or even
suggests that the best-known theories are tenable. The two most
important theories, in my opinion, are original intent (when viewed
as a value-free basis for reading or applying law) and Dworkin's
value-based "law as integrity." As for them, I am, frankly, skeptical.
But those are matters for other occasions. 16

16 The next stage of my argument is sketched briefly in "Original Intent and
Legal Interpretation," Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 24 (1999) 1-25.
Some suggestions of a subsequent stage may be found in the last two chapters of
MoralAspects of Legal Theory (Cambridge 1993).

